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I. INTRODUCTION 
Under what conditions, if any, are state courts justified in making 
policy decisions that affect the political process? We live in increasingly 
politically polarized times.1 Congress and the President are unable work 
together.2 We now see a similar pattern at the state level.3 Paralleling what 
 
 †  Professor, Hamline University, Department of Political Science and University 
of Minnesota Law School. 
 1. Political Polarization, 1994–2017, PEW RES. CTR. (Oct. 20, 2017), 
http://www.people-press.org/interactives/political-polarization-1994-2017/ 
[http://perma.cc/H6KB-5BRC] (noting the increased polarization of the American 
population over time). 
 2. See generally SARAH A. BINDER, STALEMATE: CAUSES AND CONSEQUENCES OF 
LEGISLATIVE GRIDLOCK (2003) (reviewing over fifty years of legislative history and 
deadlock as well as the evolution of congressional response to such deadlock). 
 3. See, e.g., Boris Shor, How U.S. State Legislatures Are Polarized and Getting 
More Polarized, WASH. POST. (Jan. 14, 2014), https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/mon
key-cage/wp/2014/01/14/how-u-s-state-legislatures-are-polarized-and-getting-more-polarized-
in-2-graphs/ [http://perma.cc/YHF8-XRWM]; Patrick Sisson, The Great Sorting Out: U.S. 
1
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has happened at the federal level, state judiciaries are compelled to resolve 
disputes, often involving clashes between the other branches of 
government, or addressing other salient and controversial policy issues. 
Perhaps such a tendency confirms Alexis de Tocqueville’s observation, 
“There is hardly a political question in the United States which does not 
sooner or later turn into a judicial one. Consequently, the language of 
everyday party-political controversy has to be borrowed from legal 
phraseology and conceptions.”4 
At the federal level, the U.S. Supreme Court has famously waded 
into the “political thicket” over time5—even addressing contentious issues 
such as abortion,6 marriage equality,7 immigration,8 the constitutionality of 
the Affordable Care Act,9 presidential appointment power,10 and the 
division of powers between the federal government and states.11 
States, too, have stepped in to resolve similar issues. For example, 
nationally, state courts led the way when it came to legalization of same-sex 
marriage,12 addressing issues of voter fraud and identification,13 or partisan 
gerrymandering14—even where the Supreme Court demurred or got 
involved later. Over time, scholars have questioned both the legitimacy of 
the federal courts15 and their capacity to intervene in these types of policy 
or political disputes.16 
 
Cities Polarized Along Income, Education, CURBED (Apr. 4, 2018), 
https://www.curbed.com/2018/4/4/17198384/real-estate-study-migration-united-states 
[http://perma.cc/GM8A-TX5K]. 
 4. ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA, trans. George Lawrence, 
270 (1988). 
 5. Colegrove v. Green, 328 U.S. 549, 556 (1946) (holding as to malapportionment 
that “[c]ourts ought not to enter this political thicket.”). 
 6. See Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 113 (1973). 
 7. See Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2612 (2015). 
 8. See Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2403 (2018). 
 9. See Nat’l Fed’n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 567 U.S. 519, 520 (2012). 
 10. See N.L.R.B. v. Noel Canning, 573 U.S. 513, 515 (2014). 
 11. See Medellín v. Texas, 552 U.S. 491, 496 (2008). 
 12. See Goodridge v. Dep’t of Pub. Health, 798 N.E.2d 941, 948 (Mass. 2003). 
 13. See Weinschenk v. State, 203 S.W.3d 201, 204 (Mo. 2006). 
 14. See League of Women Voters v. Commonwealth, 178 A.3d 737, 737 (Pa. 2018). 
 15. See, e.g., JEREMY RABKIN, JUDICIAL COMPULSIONS: HOW PUBLIC LAW 
DISTORTS PUBLIC POLICY 38 (1989); GERALD N. ROSENBERG, THE HOLLOW HOPE: CAN 
COURTS BRING ABOUT SOCIAL CHANGE? 1 (Benjamin I. Page ed., 1991); STUART A. 
SCHEINGOLD, THE POLITICS OF RIGHTS: LAWYERS, PUBLIC POLICY, AND POLITICAL 
CHANGE 3 (Univ. Mich. Press 2004) (1974); Donald L. Horowitz, The Courts and Social 
Policy, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1051, 1051 (1977). 
 16. Although it is not always clear exactly what types of disputes critics declare should 
be off limits to judicial intervention or dispute, for the purposes of this article, the scope 
2
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In Minnesota, the courts have been asked to address contentious 
issues, as the governor and other members of the executive branch have 
clashed with the legislature. There have been judicial requests to fund state 
government functions when no budget has been reached,17 to define the 
scope of the governor’s unallotment,18 and line-item veto powers.19 There 
have also been demands to address separation of powers issues 
demarcating the power of the legislature versus the state auditor,20 
questions invoking the single-subject rule,21 whether the lieutenant 
governor can simultaneously serve in the Minnesota Senate,22 or even 
regarding the adequacy of funding and segregation in schools.23 Each of 
these cases endeavor to bring the judicial branch into the middle of 
political-legal controversies. In some situations, courts have waded into the 
political thicket; in others they have not, employing a variety of “passive 
virtues,” such as standing or jurisdiction, to avoid the question. 
 
will be the types of disputes included in inter-or-intra-branch conflicts (e.g., disagreements 
between the legislature and the governor), or policy matters that look like they require 
discretionary or political decisions to be made by branches that are subject to electoral 
accountability. For a general discussion of the criticism of what it means for courts to make 
policy or intrude into the political process, see: David Schultz, Courts and Law in 
American Society, in LEVERAGING THE LAW: USING THE COURTS TO ACHIEVE SOCIAL 
CHANGE, 1, 23 (David A. Schultz ed., 1998). 
 17. See, e.g., In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Executive Branch of 
the State of Minnesota, No. 62-CV-11-5203, 2011 WL 2556036 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 29, 
2011); In re Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Executive Branch of the State of 
Minnesota, No. C0-05-5928, 2005 WL 6716704 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 23, 2005); In re 
Temporary Funding of Core Functions of the Executive Branch of the State of Minnesota, 
No. C9-01-5725, 2001 WL 36369516 (Minn. Dist. Ct. June 29, 2001). 
 18. See Brayton v. Pawlenty, 781 N.W.2d 357, 368 (Minn. 2010). 
 19. Compare Ninetieth Minn. State Senate v. Dayton, 903 N.W.2d 609 (2017) 
(holding that the Governor’s exercise of his line-item veto power on appropriations to the 
Legislature complied with the plain language provision of the state constitution; that the 
Governor’s line-item veto power does not violate separation of powers by effectively 
abolishing the Legislature; and that judicial restraint prevented the court from deciding 
whether the Governor’s exercise of the line-item veto power violated separation of powers 
by unconstitutionally coercing the Legislature), with Legislative Council v. Martinez, No. S-
1-SC-36422 (N.M. S. Ct. May 11, 2017) (dismissing the case on ripeness grounds, 
effectively allowing the Governor’s use of a line-item veto). 
 20. See Otto v. Wright Cty., 910 N.W.2d 446, 446 (Minn. 2018). 
 21. See Associated Builders & Contractors v. Ventura, 610 N.W.2d 293, 298–99 
(Minn. 2000). 
 22. See Dusosky v. Fischbach, No. 62-CV-18-254, 2018 WL 389173 (Minn. Dist. Ct. 
Jan. 12, 2018). 
 23. See Cruz-Guzman v. State, 916 N.W.2d 1, 2 (Minn. 2018); Skeen v. State, 505 
N.W.2d 299, 299 (Minn. 1993). 
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Nevertheless, lurking behind these legal controversies is a democratic 
theory question: Should state courts make policy, or otherwise render 
decisions, that appear as though they should be entrusted to other 
branches of state government? 
In effect, how legitimate is it for state courts to resolve these types of 
controversies? Examining this issue will be the subject of this article, 
demonstrating that problems potentially limiting federal courts do not 
apply to state courts. As a result, the latter may have more legitimacy and 
perhaps capacity to address political or policy issues than the former. 
However, state judiciaries face unique problems that the federal courts do 
not, specifically when they involve elected judges. 
In order to examine the legitimacy of state judicial policy making, this 
article will do several things. First, it will provide an overview of American 
democratic-constitutional theory as it applies at the federal level, seeking to 
clarify the problem that courts at this level face when they issue opinions 
that might be characterized as policy making. Specifically, it addresses both 
a normative issue—what has been called the counter-majoritarian 
problem—and a capacity issue—whether the federal courts have the ability 
or skills to make policy. After defining the lines of debate at the federal 
level, this article turns to state courts and constitutional theory, arguing that 
they are in a different situation than federal courts, both by virtue of the 
nature of their own constitutions and, in the case of thirty-eight states, 
having an elected judiciary. Elected judiciaries, however, generate a 
different problem—the majoritarian dilemma—a source of both legitimacy 
and illegitimacy. 
The majoritarian problem is a vexing and perhaps unsolvable 
problem for some state courts, but that problem does not take away from 
a democratic theory of state courts to intervene in political disputes in ways 
that depart from the federal courts. This article concludes that there needs 
to be either a general or state-specific theory of judicial review that 
describes when it is appropriate for state courts to intervene in political 
disputes.24 
II. AMERICAN DEMOCRATIC-CONSTITUTIONAL THEORY 
Democracies have their own unique value structures. Each 
democratic society defines itself, including “its object of inquiry, the critical 
components of what makes a political system work, and what forces, 
 
 24. Supra note 16. 
4
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structures, and assumptions are core to its conception of governance.”25 
The ontology of a democracy is what distinguishes it from other types of 
political regimes. Democracy defines not only the basic structure of how 
institutions are supposed to operate, but the political theory or set of 
values behind them that describe what these institutions are supposed to 
do. Theory, or at least democratic theory, defines institutions and their 
functions. This is the essence of what a constitution is and does, thereby 
connecting political theory to constitutional law. There are five “criteria” 
for a democracy: (1) voting equality; (2) effective participation; (3) 
opportunity for enlightened understanding; (4) control of the decision-
making agenda; and (5) intrinsic equality.26 To understand American 
constitutional theory, especially at the national level, a brief discussion of 
American democratic theory is necessary.27 
A.  The Americanization of American Democratic Theory 
There are two democratic theory traditions in the United States. The 
first is known as Madisonian democracy (named after James Madison), 
and the other is the pluralist tradition, originating in post-World War II 
political science.28 Both can be credited to American history, particularly 
the disputes between the American colonies and England. They also both 
share a common concern with the issue of how to limit abuses of power. 
However, the focus on Madisonian democracy’s core assumptions is most 
relevant to the arguments here. At root, the American Revolution involved 
a dispute over three political terms: representation, constitutionalism, and 
sovereignty. The real revolution was over the meaning of these terms and 
how they affected American political perceptions and democratic 
participation. 
Begin with the concept of representation. One of the primary 
objections the American colonists had with British rule was the taxation of 
tea and other goods. Through this, the famous saying “No taxation without 
 
 25. David A Schultz, The Phenomenology of Democracy: Putnam, Pluralism, and 
Voluntary Associations, in SOCIAL CAPITAL 74 (Scott L. McLean, David A. Schultz & 
Manfred B. Steger eds., 2002). 
 26. Robert A. Dahl, Democracy and Its Critics, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1662, 1662 (1990). 
 27. For a more detailed discussion of the elements of an American democratic 
theory of election law, see DAVID SCHULTZ, ELECTION LAW AND DEMOCRATIC THEORY 
ch. 2 (Burlington, VT: Ashgate, 2014). 
 28. Nelson Lichtenstein, The Making of the Postwar Working Class: Cultural 
Pluralism and Social Structure in World War II, 51 THE HISTORIAN 42, 42 (1988) 
(“[World War II] ended a half century of ethnic and religious division and ushered in a 
generation of consensual politics and social homogeneity.”). 
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representation!” was born.29 In making this assertion, Americans argued 
that they did not elect anyone in the British Parliament—the body that 
voted on taxes and other policies affecting America—thus, they had no 
representation.30 The British did not understand this argument and 
asserted that the interests of the American colonies were virtually 
represented in the Parliament.31 In one of the first political conflicts 
between the Colonies and England, the two sides used the same word—
representation—but meant very different things. Americans demanded a 
direct and real voice in Parliament over their own affairs. The British, 
however, refused to allow such a change.32 
A second debated concept was that of political sovereignty, which 
refers to the ultimate administrator in charge of a state or nation. For the 
British, sovereignty resided in Parliament.33 American colonists, however, 
took a different view: ultimate sovereignty resided with the people.34 
Relying on this perspective, the colonists believed they were entitled to 
influence over taxation, the control of their own representatives, the 
selection of their governors and judges, and other affairs that affected their 
lives.35 On July 4, 1776, it became clear that the thirteen states in North 
America were sovereign; they were their own country and entitled to rule 
themselves.36 
 
 29. Lord Camden, Speech on the Declaratory Bill of the Sovereignty of Great Britain 
over the Colonies, in LONDON MAGAZINE, Feb. 1768, at 89. 
 30. Letter from John Hancock, Joseph Jackson, John Ruddock, John Rowe, and 
Samuel Pemberton to all Massachusetts Counties (Sept. 14, 1768), 
https://www.notaxationwithoutrepresentation.com/ [http://perma.cc/N3SH-LEY5] (“Taxes 
equally detrimental to the Commercial interests of the Parent Country and her Colonies, 
are imposed upon the People, without their Consent.”). 
 31. See JOHN P. REID, THE CONCEPT OF REPRESENTATION IN THE AGE OF THE 
AMERICAN REVOLUTION 58 (1989) (“Edmund Burke got carried away. ‘This is virtual 
representation,’ he exclaimed of the representation of interests. ‘Such a representation I 
think to be in many cases even better than actual. . . .’”). 
 32. Id. at 43. 
 33. See generally RICHARD ASHCRAFT, REVOLUTIONARY POLITICS & LOCKE’S TWO 
TREATISES OF GOVERNMENT (1986); JAMES TULLY, A DISCOURSE ON PROPERTY: JOHN 
LOCKE AND HIS ADVERSARIES (1980). British thinkers such as John Locke had argued 
against claims by the King that sovereignty was lodged in the monarchy. This was essentially 
the argument between Sir Robert Filmer and John Locke. ASHCRAFT, supra. 
 34. See, e.g., JAMES MADISON, ESSAY ON SOVEREIGNTY (1835), 
https://rotunda.upress.virginia.edu/founders/default.xqy?keys=FOEA-print-02-02-02-3188 
[https://perma.cc/65NF-MK27]. 
 35. THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE para. 2 (U.S. 1776) (“Governments are 
instituted among Men, deriving their just Powers from the consent of the governed . . . .”). 
 36. Id. 
6
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Finally, constitutionalism is an ancient term, originally describing the 
idea that a particular ruler or regime’s actions could be illegitimate 
according to ancient laws or norms.37 Over time, constitutionalism came to 
be defined as “a government of limited powers, one which often must 
adhere to rule of law, procedural due process or regularity, and eventually 
to a commitment to the protection of individual rights.”38 During this time, 
the British equated the Parliament with the Constitution, meaning that 
Parliament defined what was constitutional.39 Unlike the British, 
Americans believed a constitution should be distinct from the government 
and define the powers to which a government was entitled. 
Familiar with the abuses of a monarchy, Americans took it upon 
themselves to define terms, such as representation, that would reflect their 
new country’s values.40 Defining these terms would affect American 
democratic theory for centuries to come. As one example, those opposing 
female suffrage had a difficult time asserting that virtual representation was 
adequate when direct representation is such a fundamental principle of the 
American Constitution. 
This experience with the British was not the only factor that defined 
the ideologies that would eventually be incorporated into the Constitution 
of 1787. Other factors included a Lockean tradition favoring equality, 
individual rights, and a secular, limited government;41 a religious Pilgrim-
 
 37. Jacob T. Levy, Ancient Constitutionalism, ENCYCLOPEDIA BRITANNICA, 
https://www.britannica.com/topic/ancient-constitutionalism [http://perma.cc/CY7D-ZVSR]. 
 38. JAMES T. MCHUGH, COMPARATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITIONS 5–10 (David 
A. Schultz ed., 2002). 
 39. See MICHAEL GORDON, PARLIAMENTARY SOVEREIGNTY IN THE UK 
CONSTITUTION: PROCESS, POLITICS AND DEMOCRACY, 13 (2015). 
 40. Thomas B. McAffee, Restoring the Lost World of Classical Legal Thought: The 
Presumption in Favor of Liberty Over Law and the Court Over the Constitution, 75 CIN. 
L. REV. 1499, 1567 (2007) (internal citations omitted) (“[I]ncreasingly Americans were 
thinking that consent was a continuous, everyday process rather than merely an ultimate 
check on government. Representation was increasingly seen as a substitute for legislation by 
direct action of the people.”). 
 41. See generally JOHN PATRICK DIGGINS, THE LOST SOUL OF AMERICAN POLITICS: 
VIRTUE, SELF-INTEREST, AND THE FOUNDATIONS OF LIBERALISM (1984) (analyzing the 
motives of American politicians, philosophers, and intellectuals as they assessed their 
respective moral responsibilities); LOUIS HARTZ, THE LIBERAL TRADITION IN AMERICA: 
AN INTERPRETATION OF AMERICAN POLITICAL THOUGHT SINCE THE REVOLUTION 7–9 
(1955) (discussing the Lockean influence on the development of the Constitution); GUIDO 
DE RUGGIERO, THE HISTORY OF EUROPEAN LIBERALISM (R.G. Collingwood trans., 
Beacon Press 1959) (1927) (comparing historical forms of liberalism with a focus on 19th 
century Europe). 
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Puritan tradition favoring religious liberty and human fallibility;42 and a 
republican tradition emphasizing a commitment to popular government, 
support for a belief in a public good, and a fear of corruption rooted in a 
concern about how wealth affected political power.43 Finally, there was a 
legal tradition credited to William Blackstone, which endorsed a 
commitment to rule of law.44 These values played a significant role in the 
development of the governing documents of the United States, including 
the 1781 Articles of Confederation.45 The Articles emphasized a 
decentralized political system. Nevertheless, the Articles should be 
considered a first draft because they did not fully address the country’s 
financial needs or the states’ veto powers.46 
Indeed, the Philadelphia Constitutional Convention took place in 
1787 because many felt that the Articles needed revision. However, 
tension existed; many Americans feared a strong national government, but 
the Articles had not provided enough authority for government to carry 
out needed functions. Thus, the framers sought a balance. 
B.  Madisonian Democracy and the Problem of Politics 
It is important to understand what the framers intended to 
accomplish upon drafting the Constitution. The Federalist Papers provide 
 
 42. See generally RICHARD HOFSTADTER, THE AMERICAN POLITICAL TRADITION 
AND THE MEN WHO MADE IT (1989) (analyzing the idealogy of historical figures and their 
impact on the American political tradition); WILSON CAREY MCWILLIAMS, THE IDEA OF 
FRATERNITY IN AMERICA (1973) (discussing puritanism and its influence on the idea of 
fraternity in America); PERRY MILLER, THE LIFE OF THE MIND IN AMERICA: FROM THE 
REVOLUTION TO THE CIVIL WAR (1965) (describing the American mind from its 
beginnings in Puritan New England). 
 43. See generally FORREST MCDONALD, NOVUS ORDO SECLORUM: THE 
INTELLECTUAL ORIGINS OF THE CONSTITUTION (1985) (discussing early Americans’ 
commitment to republicanism); THOMAS L. PANGLE, THE SPIRIT OF MODERN 
REPUBLICANISM: THE MORAL VISION OF THE AMERICAN FOUNDERS AND THE 
PHILOSOPHY OF LOCKE (1988) (describing the evolution of republicanism in America); 
J.G.A. POCOCK, THE MACHIAVELLIAN MOMENT: FLORENTINE POLITICAL THOUGHT AND 
THE ATLANTIC REPUBLICAN TRADITION (1975) (positing a connection between in the early 
sixteenth century Florence, English-Civil War Britain, and the American Revolution). 
 44. See generally BLACKSTONE IN AMERICA: SELECTED ESSAYS OF KATHRYN PREYER 
(Mary Sarah Bilder et al. eds., 2009) (discussing the ways in which American legislators and 
judges reinterpreted the English common law to work in with the new American republic); 
PERRY MILLER, THE LEGAL MIND IN AMERICA: FROM INDEPENDENCE TO THE CIVIL WAR 
(1961) (analyzing the experiences of American intellectuals that went into the establishment 
of a distinctly American identity). 
 45. ARTICLES OF CONFEDERATION of 1781. 
 46. See THE FEDERALIST NO. 12 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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some guidance—they reflect an urgent concern to limit the constraints on 
government.47 In total, eighty-five essays were written to encourage 
replacement of the Articles of Confederation with a new, more federally-
focused constitution. The Federalists argued for a centralized government 
on grounds that it would meet the needs of a new republic.48 Specifically, 
the new constitution could manage any political factions that would 
threaten the separation of the colonies.49 
Moreover, the Federalist Papers provide the political theory, analysis, 
and philosophy behind the Constitution. One scholar suggests that the 
Federalist Papers essays written by Madison provide insight into his views 
of how the Constitution would operate.50 While the Federalist Papers 
arguably may have been political propaganda for the new constitution,51 
they still provide a glimpse into what might have been intended for the 
Constitution. 
The Federalist Papers, importantly, provide thorough analysis of the 
intersection between human nature and democratic politics. Alexander 
Hamilton noted, “The science of politics, however, like most other 
sciences, has received great improvement. The efficacy of various 
principles is now well understood, which were either not known at all, or 
imperfectly known to the ancients.”52 Hamilton, along with Madison and 
Jay, believed that their analysis was based upon a solid study of politics. In 
their work, they sought to describe how best to divide political power, 
check political excess, and assure accountability to the people.53 In short, 
they sought to preserve the principles of popular or republican 
government and place them on firmer footing.54 
 
 47. Letter from James Madison to James K. Paulding (July 23, 1818), reprinted in 
THE WRITINGS OF JAMES MADISON 1808–19 (1908), 
https://oll.libertyfund.org/titles/madison-the-writings-vol-8-1808-1819 
[https://perma.cc/GU93-Q3MF] (“The immediate object of [the Papers] was to vindicate & 
recommend the new Constitution to the State of [New York] whose ratification of the 
instrument, was doubtful, as well as important.”). 
 48. THE FEDERALIST NO. 39 (James Madison). 
 49. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 50. See, e.g., Charles M. Yablon, Madison’s Full Faith and Credit Clause: A 
Historical Analysis, 33 CARDOZO L. REV. 125, 125–26 (2011). 




 52. THE FEDERALIST NO. 9 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 53. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 48, 49 (James Madison). 
 54. Id. 
9
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When examining public opinion, Madison claimed, “all governments 
rest on opinion.”55 Democratic government does this, as it should aim to 
derive consent from its people. As Abraham Lincoln famously concluded, 
the government should be “of the people, by the people, for the people.”56 
However, while public opinion is often seen as an asset to democracy, it 
also can weaken the institution.57 Madison wrote that a government should 
not often make appeals to popular sentiment to resolve political issues.58 
He reasoned that groups of people can turn reasonable opinions into 
restless sentiment and unruly passion, and that public opinion can be 
unstable. 
Hamilton similarly pronounced, “[M]en are ambitious, vindictive, 
and rapacious.”59 These feelings should not rule the government; instead, 
some mechanism is needed to calm individual sentiments before making 
public choices. Individuals are generally motivated by reason or virtues of 
something larger than themselves.60 Likewise, Madison wrote, “If men 
were angels, no government would be necessary. If angels were to govern 
men, neither external nor internal controls on government would be 
necessary.”61 As these passages illustrate, the Federalist Papers are based 
on human psychology—specifically, the notion that humans are self-
interested. Because humans cannot always be expected to be fair or 
selfless, a sound government is crucial. 
The solution—arguably the genius—of American politics may be in 
encouraging diversity. At one point, the country, like Madison, seemed to 
believe that the power of majority rule should control threats posed by 
minority groups.62 Yet, the real issue was how to prevent majoritarian 
opinions and factions from dominating. 
 
 55. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison). 
 56. Abraham Lincoln, Gettysburg Address (Nov. 19, 1863). 
 57. Emma Green, The Downside of Democracy: A 1979 Book on Presidential 
Selection Inadvertently Predicted the Rise of Trump—and the Weakness of a Popular 
Primary System, THE ATLANTIC (May 29, 2016), https://www.theatlantic.com/politics/archi
ve/2016/05/the-downside-of-democracy/484415/ [http://perma.cc/6FMS-UB2L]. 
 58. THE FEDERALIST NO. 49 (James Madison). 
 59. THE FEDERALIST NO. 6 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 60. Emily Esfahani Smith, There’s More to Life Than Being Happy: Meaning 
Comes From the Pursuit of More Complex Things Than Happiness, THE ATLANTIC (Jan. 
9, 2013), https://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2013/01/theres-more-to-life-than-
being-happy/266805/ [http://perma.cc/MEX5-QU24] (explaining prominent psychologist 
Martin E. P. Seligman’s perspective that “you use your highest strengths and talents to 
belong to and serve something you believe is larger than the self”). 
 61. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 62. THE FEDERALIST NO. 57 (James Madison). 
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According to Madison, the political society needs to address three 
competing goals: the preservation of a republican form of government, 
individual liberty, and limitation on the threat of factions to both 
republican government and individual liberty.63 Factions, if composed of a 
numeric minority, can be handled by majority rule and elections. In other 
words, the majority will continue to rule based on popular vote. The actual 
issue, though, is what to do with a faction that constitutes a majority. 
Madison argued that the issue is how to control their actions: 
When a majority is included in a faction, the form of popular 
government, on the other hand, enables it to sacrifice to its 
ruling passion or interest both the public good and the rights of 
other citizens. To secure the public good and private rights 
against the danger of such a faction, and at the same time to 
preserve the spirit and the form of popular government, is then 
the great object to which our inquiries are directed.64 
Phrased otherwise, the question, as Alexis de Tocqueville would later 
ask, is how can the American republic deal with the threats of the tyranny 
of the majority?65 Or, in other words, how can majority rule be balanced 
with minority rights? How does one allow for majority opinion to rule, as 
it should in a popular government, but not let it become destructive, acting 
impulsively or rashly when threatened? Madison believed the solution was 
three-fold: “(1) direct citizen control for representatives; (2) political 
homogeneity for diversity; and (3) a small democracy for a large 
republic.”66 
The first change from classical republicanism identified by Madison 
is limiting direct access to the political system. This allows level-headed 
individuals to represent the masses and avoid irrational action.67 For 
Madison, such a government would provide a balanced assessment of 
public opinion, and thus could improve the public good.68 The second and 
third changes Madison suggested are closely related, as it would be 
impossible to combine or rid factions, inequalities, or diversities without 
obstructing liberty. These groups and differences will always exist. Size and 
diversity must increase in the government itself. Put another way, the 
 
 63. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 64. Id. 
 65. DE TOCQUEVILLE, supra note 4, at 250–53. 
 66. SHEILA KENNEDY & DAVID SCHULTZ, AMERICAN PUBLIC SERVICE: 
CONSTITUTIONAL AND ETHICAL FOUNDATIONS 84 (2011). 
 67. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
 68. Id. 
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smaller a democracy, the easier it would be for a faction to dominate. In 
Madison’s words: 
Extend the sphere, and you take in a greater variety of parties 
and interests; you make it less probable that a majority of the 
whole will have a common motive to invade the rights of other 
citizens; or if such a common motive exists, it will be more 
difficult for all who feel it to discover their own strength, and to 
act in unison with each other.69 
This technique involved not just allowing a thousand factions to 
bloom, but using these factions to counteract one another—letting ambition 
counteract ambition and faction check faction can control the threat of 
factions.70 The solution to constraining the distortion of faction and tyranny 
of majoritarian opinions lies in limiting the access of these groups to all the 
tools they need to oppress others. It lies in complicating the processes by 
which these groups form without ever restricting liberty or denying their 
right to form associations. 
Madison and the other authors of the Federalist Papers describe 
additional mechanisms to address the threat of majority factions. All are 
directed toward making it harder for majority factions to form, or if they 
do form, to make it difficult for them to gather and exercise political 
power in a destructive fashion. There are numerous pieces to the puzzle 
directed at breaking up political power and frustrating a majority from 
taking political control. In Federalist no. 51, Madison connects self-interest 
to government, arguing that if one can link constitutional power or duties 
with institutional and individual self-interest, the competition among the 
three branches of government will serve to check them against one 
another,71 and thus “balance” their relative power.72 For example, Congress 
generally is unable to pass laws on its own without approval from the 
President. Likewise, the President cannot bring the country to war without 
Congress’s permission, and the judicial branch is presumably unable to 
pass laws.73 No one branch exclusively possesses all the power necessary to 
run the country. 
 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. THE FEDERALIST NO. 51 (James Madison). 
 72. See, CHARLES DE SECONDAT, BARON DE MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE 
LAWS passim (Anne M. Cohler, Basia Carolyn Miller & Harold Samuel Stone eds., 1989). 
 73. U.S. CONST. art II, § 2 (providing that the President is the Commander-in-Chief 
of the armed forces); see also id. art. I, § 8 (empowering Congress to declare war); id. at art. 
III, § 1–2 (providing that there is no enumerated power of the judiciary to pass laws). 
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Furthermore, none of the branches were intended to be dominant.74 
To this end, a bicameral Congress was created to balance legislative 
power. The election timelines for the House and Senate, two versus six 
years respectively, also were intended to prevent any single faction from 
taking control. Each of the above-mentioned measures were taken to 
prevent a majority faction from taking power over the government. 
Federalism further checks political power. In a way, it serves as a 
fence or border to control factions. A group of citizens may exert great 
influence or control over a state government, but the federal government 
would be yet another hurdle for that faction to conquer. Federalism 
ultimately breaks up political power. Thus, the Federalist Papers provide 
insight regarding how to abate the problems that majority factions present 
without violating individual liberties. 
The Constitution provides a possible mechanism for controlling the 
power of majority factions. Instead of seeking to suppress groups, it uses 
certain techniques to disperse political power, including: interest 
competition in a heterogeneous and enlarged political society, 
representation, bicameralism, checks and balances, separation of powers, 
and federalism. In sum, the goal is that political power will check itself and 
that no group will have the power to rapidly change the system.75 
The goal of Madisonian democracy is to avoid tyranny—to avoid 
potential situations where power is concentrated and can threaten 
individual liberty. Ultimately, it is premised on the idea that a real 
substantive public good does exist. The constitutional machinery that 
Madison proposed is meant, in part, to clear away those forces that 
threaten representatives and the political process from articulating the 
public good. The legislative process, so to speak, is polluted when factions 
or special interest groups exercise adverse political pressure. Thus, checks 
and balances, separation of powers, and federalism, among other values, 
are all aimed at solving the problems of politics and creating a republic 
that can pursue or discover the public good. 
A faction-ridden political process is a threat to individual rights and 
the public good. Nonetheless, it is important to note that this model of 
protecting rights relied upon the political process. The Constitution’s logic 
 
 74. See id. art. I–III (establishing a bicameral legislature, executive branch, and 
separate judiciary). See generally John F. Manning, Separation of Powers as Ordinary 
Interpretation, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1939 (2011) (arguing that because the constitution does 
not adopt freestanding separation of powers, interpreters should “determine the allocation 
of power by asking how it is effectuated by particular clauses.”). 
 75. THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison). 
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almost transformed the political process into a big machine.76 Each 
constituent—such as Congress or the courts—had a particular role in it. The 
original constitutional solution was to use the political process to police 
itself against majority factions. 
Despite its rationale, the Madisonian model has flaws, such as 
assuming that a larger political system might prevent larger factions from 
forming. While at one point that may have held steady, in an era of 
cellphones, the internet, and social media, factions are easily formed. 
Another problem with the Madisonian model is the premise that minority 
factions cannot constitute a threat. Majority rule was intended to address 
the problem of these smaller factions. But small, well-organized groups 
can be powerful. These groups can play an outsized role in politics.77 
Organizations such as the National Rifle Association, the American 
Association of Retired Persons, and others exercise disproportionate 
influence in the American political process. While they may be minority 
groups in numbers, they use lobbyists and political contributions to 
exercise significant influence. Moreover, as Carolene Products illustrates, 
there are various forces that can cause the political process to close down.78 
Nonetheless, the point here is that the political process does not always 
operate properly, and it may malfunction. What to do? Enter James 
Madison. 
The Founders anticipated this problem and grappled with it when 
they met in 1787. Federalists, such as Alexander Hamilton and James 
Madison, favored replacing the Articles of Confederation with a new 
constitution that would strengthen the central government.79 They 
reasoned that replacement would provide a more effective method for 
regulating commerce, supporting the union, and uniting a common 
 
 76. MICHAEL KAMMEN, A MACHINE THAT WOULD GO OF ITSELF: THE 
CONSTITUTION IN AMERICAN CULTURE (1987). 
 77. See generally BENJAMIN G. BISHIN, TYRANNY OF THE MINORITY: THE 
SUBCONSTITUENCY POLITICS THEORY OF REPRESENTATION (2009) (discussing how the 
desires of subconstituencies often outweigh the desires of the majority); MANCUR OLSON, 
THE LOGIC OF COLLECTIVE ACTION: PUBLIC GOODS AND THE THEORY OF GROUPS 
(1965) (explaining how a large group with a common interest does not automatically give 
rise to collective action without individual incentive). 
 78. See United States v. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. 144, n.4 (1938) 
(“[P]rejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be a special condition, which tends 
seriously to curtail the operation of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to 
protect minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more searching judicial 
inquiry.”); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST 103–104 (1980). 
 79. THE FEDERALIST NOS. 16, 17 (Alexander Hamilton), NOS. 18, 19, 20 (Alexander 
Hamilton & James Madison). 
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defense. However, not everyone agreed that the Articles of Confederation-
based government was bad or that the new constitution amounted to an 
improvement. In particular, the Anti-Federalists feared that the new 
government would become too powerful and that it would threaten 
individual rights.80 As a result, they insisted there be a bill of rights. 
In Federalist no. 84, Hamilton dismissed the need for a bill of rights, 
arguing that to include one would be to assert that there were some powers 
that the national government did not possess.81 Hamilton’s arguments were 
unsuccessful.82 Many state legislatures adopted calls for bills of rights as 
they ratified the new constitution.83 Eventually, James Madison relented, 
promising to introduce a bill of rights in Congress if the new constitution 
was adopted.84 The states ratified the Constitution, and Madison kept his 
promise. He offered seventeen amendments in the House of 
Representatives in 1789. Ten of these amendments became the Bill of 
Rights upon ratification in December 1791.85 
Adoption of the Bill of Rights was not only a triumph for the Anti-
Federalists, but also a conceptual and perhaps de facto recognition that the 
political process alone cannot police itself to protect rights. The adoption 
of the Bill of Rights represented a significant shift in how the national 
government was to operate. As originally envisioned in the Federalist 
Papers, the political process would be governed through a system of 
checks and balances, separation of powers, and other constitutional 
mechanisms. Although this process defended individual rights and the 
public good, the Anti-Federalists still believed individual rights needed 
specification.86 As Supreme Court Justice Robert Jackson stated in West 
Virginia v. Barnette: 
The very purpose of a Bill of Rights was to withdraw certain 
subjects from the vicissitudes of political controversy, to place 
 
 80. Paul Finkelman, Turning Losers into Winners: What Can We Learn, If 
Anything, From the Antifederalists?, 79 TEX. L. REV. 849, 855 (2001). 
 81. THE FEDERALIST NO. 84 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 82. U.S. CONST. amends. I–X. 
 83. See LIBERTY AND ORDER: THE FIRST AMERICAN PARTY STRUGGLE 15 (Lance 
Banning ed., 2004). 
 84. NCC Staff, On This Day: James Madison Introduces the Bill of Rights, CONST. 
DAILY (June 8, 2018), https://constitutioncenter.org/blog/on-this-day-james-madison-
introduces-the-bill-of-rights [http://perma.cc/N8X5-U7YW]. 
 85. Id. 
 86. See generally THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS AND THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION DEBATES (Ralph Ketcham ed., 1986) (providing a historical context for 
constitutional debates as well as criticisms of a centralized government with implications on 
the broad expanse of such power). 
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them beyond the reach of majorities and officials and to 
establish them as legal principles to be applied by the courts. 
One’s right to . . . freedom of worship . . . and other 
fundamental rights may not be submitted to vote; they depend 
on the outcome of no elections.87 
The adoption of the Bill of Rights was a major change in how 
American democracy and the judicial branch operated. It addressed the 
majority faction problem very differently from the original Constitution. 
Neither elections nor politics should be potential threats to individual 
rights; the latter are not protected by the political process; rather, they are 
protected from it. If by some chance laws are adopted that threaten such 
rights, it would be the federal courts—made up of individuals not directly 
elected by the people—who would enforce and protect rights. Thus, 
protection of rights shifted from the regular political process described in 
the Federalist Papers, to a clear statement of individual protections 
defended and defined by the judiciary. 
C.  A Madisonian Theory of Judicial Review 
Madisonian democracy, then, is premised upon a substantive belief 
that a public good exists which needs to be protected from the tyranny of 
the majority. It develops a twofold distinction which says that in most 
situations, majorities get their way, but in some, they do not. When 
minority rights are threatened, the courts step in to protect them. Of 
course, there are debates regarding who constitutes a minority deserving 
protection and under what circumstances protection should be granted, 
depending on, for example, what types of rights are affected.88 
Legal scholars debate whether the constitutional framers sought to 
protect economic rights and property interests or the civil rights of 
“discrete and insular” minorities, as understood in a post-footnote-
number-four-Carolene-Products constitutional order.89 Moreover, some 
have argued that Madisonian democracy has been replaced by pluralism 
as the dominant theory of American democracy.90 The latter placed 
greater emphasis upon the role of group competition and bargaining as a 
mechanism to limit and distribute political power,91 but it fundamentally 
 
 87. 319 U.S. 624, 638 (1943). 
 88. Owen M. Fiss, Groups and the Equal Protection Clause, 5 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 
107, 147 (1976). 
 89. ELY, supra note 78, at 100–105. 
 90. See, e.g., Edwin L. Rubin, Getting Past Democracy, 149 U. Pa. L.R. 711, 781 
(2001). 
 91. Id. at 741. 
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agreed with the Madisonian concern of addressing abuses of power by 
groups. 
Whether it be Madisonian democracy or pluralism, it is fundamental 
to American democratic-constitutional theory that policy decisions should 
be made by electorally accountable institutions such as Congress and the 
President, reserving to the federal judiciary the protection of individual 
rights. American democratic-constitutional theory balances majority rule 
with minority rights. 
In performing this task, federal courts perform a crucial role. As 
Chief Justice John Marshall said in Marbury v. Madison, “[i]t is 
emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department to say what 
the law is.”92 Under Marbury, the power of judicial review is in determining 
whether laws are valid under the Constitution.93 Or, as Alexander 
Hamilton declared in Federalist no. 78, the power of the judiciary extends 
to “neither FORCE nor WILL, but merely judgment.”94 The dilemma for 
the federal courts is a delicate one. They must render judgments regarding 
the constitutionality or meaning of laws, while not crossing a line into 
actually making policy. Crossing this line implicates two issues: capacity 
and legitimacy. 
Capacity raises questions regarding the institutional ability of the 
courts to make policy. There is a long-running debate addressing this 
issue, raising questions over whether the federal courts have affected social 
or political change, or managed it correctly when it comes to issues such as 
desegregation and abortion.95 Whatever questions there are regarding the 
capacity of the courts to affect and oversee policy change, there is a more 
fundamental question regarding the legitimacy to do so. This raises what 
Alexander Bickel labels as the “counter-majoritarian” problem.96 
Alexander Bickel declared, “judicial review is undemocratic” because 
“it thwarts the will of representatives of the actual people of the here and 
now; it exercises control, not in behalf of the prevailing majority, but 
 
 92. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803). 
 93. Id. at 180. 
 94. THE FEDERALIST NO. 78 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 95. See, e.g., DONALD L. HOROWITZ, THE COURTS AND SOCIAL POLICY 1–21 
(1977); MICHAEL W. MCCANN, RIGHTS AT WORK: PAY EQUITY REFORM AND THE 
POLITICS OF LEGAL MOBILIZATION 178 (1994); RABKIN, supra note 15, at 260, 268; 
ROSENBERG, supra note 15 passim; Schultz, supra note 16 at 1–10; David Schultz & 
Stephen E. Gottlieb, Legal Functionalism and Social Change: A Reassessment of 
Rosenberg’s the Hollow Hope: Can Courts Bring About Social Change?, 12 J. L. & POL. 
63 passim (1995). 
 96. ALEXANDER M. BICKEL, THE LEAST DANGEROUS BRANCH: THE SUPREME 
COURT AT THE BAR OF POLITICS 17 (2d ed. 1986). 
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against it.”97 The thought Bickel conceived here is that judicial review as 
employed by the federal courts is “counter-majoritarian.”98 Specifically, the 
problem is that judicial review can be undemocratic because it gives 
unelected judges the authority to make decisions that nullify or thwart the 
choices made by those electorally accountable and picked by the people. 
If democracy is about majority rule as represented by policies made by 
those who are elected by the people, then to let the federal courts prevent 
the expression of that will seems undemocratic.99 
Bickel’s claim has formed a conundrum for legal scholars.100 There 
are many ways to unravel it. One is to contend, as Kenneth Arrow101 and 
Robert Dahl102 have done, that there is no way to aggregate majority 
preferences in a democracy, that it really consists of “minorities rule,” or 
that Madisonian democracy has been overlaid with a pluralist structure 
such that majority rule does not exist. Another way is to assert that the 
class and economic nature of American capitalism renders majority rule 
but an illusion.103 Additionally, Bickel may have simply misunderstood the 
nature of American democracy. Contrary to Bickel’s claim, American 
democracy is a constitutional one, expressing liberal values, and set up 
from the start to balance majority rule with minority rights. 
Bickel’s argument is an institutional design claim. It seems to rely 
upon a classic formal distinction—and a false dichotomy—between policy 
and rights. Policy is the job of the elected political branches, and courts are 
supposed to protect rights. This approach assumes that federal courts are 
not political because they are not elected and supposedly above politics. 
As a result, courts should not render decisions that second-guess the will 
of the majority. The approach also supports an argument that since the 
federal courts are not elected, they do not represent the people in the way 
that the elected branches do.104 
 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 16–17. 
 99. See Walt Cubberly, New Foundations for Constitutional Adjudication in State 
Court, 24 APP. ADVOC. 425, 427 (2012) (explaining that unelected and life-tenured federal 
judges do not represent the will of the majority of the people). 
 100. See, e.g., Barry Friedman, The Birth of an Academic Obsession: The History of 
the Countermajoritarian Difficulty, Part Five, 112 YALE L.J. 153, 155 & n.5 (2002). 
 101. KENNETH ARROW, SOCIAL CHOICE AND INDIVIDUAL VALUES (2d ed. 1963). 
 102. ROBERT A. DAHL, A PREFACE TO DEMOCRATIC THEORY (1956); ROBERT A 
DAHL, WHO GOVERNS? DEMOCRACY AND POWER IN AN AMERICAN CITY (1961). 
 103. See, e.g., MARTIN GILENS, AFFLUENCE AND INFLUENCE: ECONOMIC INEQUALITY 
AND POLITICAL POWER IN AMERICA 252 (2012). 
 104. BICKEL, supra note 96, at 16. 
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Again, there are many problems with these formulations. It is 
possible the federal government was never designed to be a pure 
majoritarian government.105 The existence of the Electoral College and the 
fact that the President is not directly elected by the people supports this 
argument. The great compromise of the Constitutional Convention of 
1787 is another example; it created a two-house Congress resulting in a 
Senate that was not elected, and which was not apportioned on the basis of 
population. Further, there is a vast body of administrative law literature 
that questions the politics-administration dichotomy and argues that in 
reality, unelected government administrators make law and policy.106 Thus, 
judicial review constitutes policy making no matter how refined or narrow. 
The overall claim here is that one can assert that judicial review in 
any form is counter-majoritarian while simultaneously asserting that it is 
not, and that in some cases, as John Hart Ely contends, it reinforces 
majority rule.107 Even Bickel, referencing Charles Black, pointed to how it 
could legitimize majority rule.108 Another argument is that it is not 
intuitively clear in a formalistic or realistic sense what it means to be 
counter-majoritarian. But having said all that, many consider it illegitimate 
for federal courts to employ judicial review, except in the narrowest of 
situations, because unelected judges are making decisions that negate 
choices made by elected officials.109 
Bickel urges restraint when federal courts employ judicial review. He 
advocates for them to employ a host of “passive virtues,” such as the 
political question doctrine, standing, and jurisdictional tests to 
 
 105. Evenwel v. Abbott, 136 S. Ct. 1120, 1138 (2016) (Thomas, J., concurring) 
(“Because of the Framers’ concerns about placing unchecked power in political majorities, 
the Constitution’s majoritarian provisions were only part of a complex republican 
structure.”). 
 106. See, e.g., Neomi Rao, Administrative Collusion: How Delegation Diminishes the 
Collective Congress, 90 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1463, 1525 (2015); Peter L. Strauss, The Place of 
Agencies in Government: Separation of Powers and the Fourth Branch, 84 COLUM. L. 
REV. 573, 583 (1984). 
 107. ELY, supra note 78. 
 108. See Bickel, supra note 96, at 29. 
 109. Compare Jeremy Waldron, The Core of The Case Against Judicial Review, 
YALE L.J. 1346, n. 128 (2006) (“Sometimes the power of judicial review will be exercised 
tyrannically to prevent legislatures from according people (what are in fact) their rights.”), 
with Daniel O’Cooke, The Legitimacy of Judicial Review in Individual Rights Cases: 
Michael Perry’s Constitutional Theory and Beyond, 587 INDIANA L.J., 590–92 (1985) 
(arguing that although the Supreme Court acts against the majority when it exercises judicial 
review of individual rights, protecting individual rights declared by the Constitution gives 
the Court “unquestionable legitimacy”). 
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institutionally limit their actions.110 He, along with Herbert Wechsler111 and 
Robert Bork,112 also advocated for the use of neutral principles to constrain 
judicial review and policy making.113 However, there also is a problem in 
taking a position that the federal courts should stay out of the political 
thicket. Failure to address legal claims arising out of malapportionment, 
for example, undermined democracy and majority rule, which required 
the Court in Baker v. Carr to reformulate the political question doctrine, 
rethink justiciability,114 and take action.115 Thus, when the political process 
seems incapable of functioning properly, there is a rationale for judicial 
intervention. 
D.  The Institutional Legitimacy of Federal Judicial Review 
To sum it up, there is arguably an institutional legitimacy issue when 
unelected federal judges use judicial review in ways that nullify decisions 
rendered by the other coordinate branches of the federal government: the 
branches are electorally accountable; unelected judges are not. Policy, and 
the resolution of policy and political issues, are supposed to be solved by 
the latter, not the former. This is the federal judiciary’s counter-
majoritarian problem. This problem is rooted in the U.S. Constitution’s 
structure, which constrains the federal courts through concepts of checks 
and balances and separation of powers to question if and when they are 
ever permitted to render decisions that ought to be made instead by 
electorally accountable institutions. 
III.  STATE COURTS ARE UNBOUND BY THE FEDERAL MODEL OF 
CONSTRAINTS 
State judiciaries are both similar and different from the federal courts. 
Institutionally, federal courts derive their authority from Article III of the 
 
 110. See Bickel, supra note 96, at 11–199. 
 111. See Herbert Wechsler, Toward Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law, 73 
HARV. L. REV. 1 passim (1959). 
 112. See Robert H. Bork, Neutral Principles and Some First Amendment Problems, 
47 IND. L.J. 1 passim (1971). 
 113. See Bickel, supra note 96, at 49–64. 
 114. Jack L. Landau, State Constitutionalism and the Limits of Judicial Power, 69 
RUTGERS U. L. REV. 1309, 1310 (2017) (stating that the federal justiciability doctrine has 
developed over the last century under the Article III “case or controversy” requirement). 
 115. 369 U.S. 186, 216–18 (1962). However, even as expanded in Baker, the 
Supreme Court did not lift all bars to justiciability but instead expanded somewhat the 
limited power of the federal courts to get involved in some matters that Colgrove suggested 
were beyond the scope of federal judicial authority. 
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Constitution.116 They are subject to the limits of this Article and the overall 
Constitution as it imposes limits on the federal government, including 
setting up the formal institutional division of labor that places the 
responsibility of making policy in the hands of the electorally-accountable 
institutions of Congress and the presidency.117 
But state courts are different. While states may be subject to the same 
sociological pressures, such as the factions that Madison warned about in 
Federalist nos. 10 and 51, there may be differences in how federal and 
state institutions respond to them. The U.S. Constitution, especially the 
Supremacy Clause, still binds state courts,118 and they are subject to review 
when they decide on federal questions.119 However, state courts are subject 
to different designs that allow them to depart from the federal model in 
critical ways.120 For example, state constitutions may allow for their courts 
to issue advisory opinions,121 perform functions not normally given to 
federal courts,122 or address expanded notions of state action and 
jurisdiction that contrast with federal courts.123 State courts also have clear 
 
 116. U.S. CONST., art I, § 1. 
 117. See supra Section C. 
 118. See Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. 264, 447 (1821); Martin v. Hunter’s Lessee, 14 
U.S. 304, 359 (1816). 
 119. See, e.g., Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1032–33 (1983) (noting that state 
decisions rendered on adequate and independent state grounds are not subject to federal 
review unless there are federal questions left unresolved by them); Michigan v. Mosley, 423 
U.S. 96, 120–121 (1976) (Brennan dissenting and noting that states could impose higher 
standards than mandated by federal law). See generally William J. Brennan, Jr., State 
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REV. 489, 490–91 
(1977) (discussing the paucity of federal questions presented to the Court prior to a “legal 
revolution” whereby state courts became more involved as “guardians of our liberties.”). 
 120. ROBERT F. WILLIAMS, THE LAW OF AMERICAN STATE CONSTITUTIONS 288, 299 
(2009). 
 121. See Charles M. Carberry, Comment, The State Advisory Opinion in Perspective, 
44 FORDHAM L. REV. 81, 81–82 (1975); Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive 
Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1844–52 (2001). 
 122. Perhaps the most notable difference being that state courts are entrusted to 
regulate the practice of law including issues of admission to practice, promulgating and 
enforcing rules of professional conduct, and attorney ethics disciplinary matters. See, e.g., 
MINN. STAT. § 480.05 (2018). 
 123. See WILLIAMS, supra note 120, at 188. Compare N.J. Coal. Against the War in 
the Middle East v. J.M.B. Realty Corp., 650 A.2d 757, 770–71 (N.J. 1994), with Robins v. 
Pruneyard Shopping Center, 592 P.2d 341, 346–47 (Cal. 1979), aff’d, 447 U.S. 74 (1980). 
These two cases are examples of different state and federal approaches to the state action 
doctrine. 
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authority to order funding to maintain their functions.124 One of the more 
significant differences between state and federal courts is that in thirty-eight 
states, judiciaries are elected, while federal judges and justices are 
nominated by the president, subject to advice and consent (i.e. 
confirmation) by the Senate.125 These differences are significant—they 
speak to the counter-majoritarian issue. 
A.  State Courts and the Counter-Majoritarian Problem 
State courts operating under their own constitutions might not face 
the same legitimacy issue that the federal judiciary does. For the federal 
judiciary, the counter-majoritarian problem resides in the fact that judges 
and justices are appointed under a constitution of limited powers. These 
jurists run the risk of making policy that displaces or voids majoritarian 
preferences when they make decisions. There is a fine line between 
interpreting the Constitution and articulating policy under a separation-of-
powers system that delegates policy making to the electorally accountable 
branches of the government.126 In a constitutional system of limited and no 
inherent powers, federal courts run the risk of the counter-majoritarian 
problem.127 
State courts are not as likely to face this problem. Depending on the 
state constitution, state judiciaries may be empowered to do certain things 
that the federal courts cannot.128 Simply put, state jurisprudence might 
dissolve the counter-majoritarian problem for state courts because their 
institutional designs are different.129 
Moreover, the election of judges in thirty-eight states might provide 
additional endorsement for judicial intervention. Electing judges might 
give them the authority or legitimacy to intervene into the political process 
in ways that unelected judiciaries cannot.130 Elections render judges directly 
accountable to the public, giving the public a check on the judicial branch 
 
 124. See, e.g., State v. Randolph, 800 N.W.2d 150, 160 (2011); In re Clerk of Court’s 
Comp. for Lyon Cty. v. Lyon Cty. Comm’rs, 308 Minn. 172, 177–78, 241 N.W.2d 781, 
784–85 (1976); Commonwealth v. Tate, 274 A. 2d 193, 199–200 (Pa. 1971). 
 125. See Steven P. Croley, The Majoritarian Difficulty: Elective Judiciaries and the 
Rule of Law, 62 U. CHI. L. REV. 689, 725–26 (1995). 
 126. Schultz, supra note 16, at 2–3. 
 127. See Croley, supra note 125, at 711; see Bickel, supra note 96, at 16–17. 
 128. See Hans A. Linde, The State and Federal Courts in Governance: Vive La. 
Différence!, 46 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1273 (2005) (discussing differences in how state and 
federal courts perform functions, including judicial review). 
 129. See Croley, supra note 125, at 713. 
 130. Id. at 709, 713. 
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if they do not like the decisions rendered.131 Judges, by virtue of being 
elected, can claim to represent majorities and can claim their own 
independent mandate to resolve political or policy disputes. In effect, if 
majorities elect state judges, it is harder to argue that these jurists are acting 
in a counter-majoritarian fashion. 
Of course, recognizing or acknowledging that judges are majoritarian 
runs the risk of turning judges into politicians with robes, perhaps 
especially if they also are endorsed in partisan elections. Maintaining 
courts as impartial institutions that are above politics is critical to their 
public support and legitimacy.132 Ambivalence over whether elected judges 
are no different from other elected officials stems, in part, from the 
dispute over case law seeking to regulate state judicial elections and 
campaign behavior.133 How much do we let judicial candidates do in terms 
of campaigning or raising funds? 
Resolving the state court counter-majoritarian problem by fully 
endorsing judges as elected policy-making officials certainly poses risks. 
However, when doing so against the backdrop of a different institutional 
design with fewer limits on justiciability, it may be enough to say that there 
is no problem with state courts stepping in to resolve state political 
disputes. While most state courts do not face the counter-majoritarian 
problem as acutely as do federal courts, they face a different problem—the 
majoritarian problem. 
B.  State Courts and the Majoritarian Problem 
Steven Croley declares state courts confront a majoritarian problem 
when they elect their judges.134 Croley explains, “[T]he majoritarian 
difficulty asks not how unelected/unaccountable judges can be justified in a 
regime committed to democracy, but rather how elected/accountable 
judges can be justified in a regime committed to constitutionalism.”135 For 
Croley, the majoritarian problem that elected state judges face is rooted in 
the concepts of constitutionalism located in Madisonian democracy. 
 
 131. Id. at 708. 
 132. See, e.g., Republican Party of Minn. v. White, 536 U.S. 765, 775–84 (2002) 
(discussing maintaining impartiality as an important governmental interest in regulating 
judicial elections and campaigning). 
 133. David Schultz, Minn. Republican Party v. White and the Future of State Judicial 
Selection, 69 ALBANY L. REV. 985 (2006). 
 134. Croley, supra note 125, at 694 (“[C]onstitutionalism entails, among other 
important things, protection of the individual and of minorities from democratic 
governance over certain spheres.”). 
 135. Id. 
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In conceptualizing the majoritarian problem, Croley distinguishes 
democracy from constitutionalism.136 The former is about majority rule, 
whereby “[a]ll qualified members of the political community have an equal 
voice in political decisions made by the community, such that political 
decisions generating the support of a majority of the community’s 
members for that reason carry the day.”137 This contrasts with a concept of 
constitutionalism that declares: “Majoritarian authority is limited by the 
constitutional rights individuals hold against the majority, such that policies 
supported by a majority that contravene those rights, substantively or 
procedurally, are for that reason without force.”138 The two are in tension, 
if not conflict. 
These contrasting traditions of democracy and constitutionalism 
arguably can be reconciled if one simply concludes American or 
Madisonian democracy is inherently one that declares that majority rule is 
tempered by minority rights. Even with that acknowledgment, the dilemma 
of when to intervene in the political process still exists for elected 
judiciaries. According to Croley: 
None of this is to say that constitutionalism cannot be 
characterized in a way that renders it compatible with 
majoritarian democracy. One might well describe 
constitutionalism as the mechanism by which the democratic 
majority keeps itself faithful to certain important decisions it 
makes. But this recharacterizes rather than escapes the tension 
described. For now the conflict is between “the enlightened 
majority”—the majority in its constitutional robes—and “the 
impassioned majority”—the majority in its everyday dress. . . . 
However constitutionalism is characterized, the political 
authority of some majority, if not “the” majority, is 
circumscribed. That circumscription is commonly justified in 
part on the grounds that that majority threatens individual 
freedom.139 
Part of the majoritarian problem for elected judges is determining 
why they should be able to substitute their policy or interpretive 
preferences for those expressed by a state legislature or governor. 
Furthermore, replacing the judgment of the coordinate branches is part of 
the problem with substantive due process. In Lochner v. New York, 
Justice Holmes wrote regarding legislative efforts to regulate the economy: 
 
 136. Id. at 701–706. 
 137. Id. at 703. 
 138. Id. at 705. 
 139. Id. at 705–06. 
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If it were a question whether I agreed with that theory, I should 
desire to study it further and long before making up my mind. 
But I do not conceive that to be my duty, because I strongly 
believe that my agreement or disagreement has nothing to do 
with the right of a majority to embody their opinions in law.140 
His point was to question the legitimacy of the courts in second-
guessing decisions that ought to be rendered by the political process 
instead. Why should the judiciary “win” when it comes to deciding whose 
policy views prevail? If the reason is to consistently favor its views over 
those of the other branches, then the majoritarian problem is also one of 
conflict of interest. Thus, if an elected court favors its decisions at the 
expense of other branches, it runs the risk of compromising impartiality 
and neutrality. 
But there is a different aspect of the majoritarian problem even more 
dangerous: elected judges might sacrifice minority rights in order to get 
reelected.141 Accountability to majorities, for Croley, means potentially 
compromising the independence needed to make tough decisions, as in 
protecting the rights of criminal defendants, abortion rights in pro-life 
communities, and defending people of color against racist preferences.142 
Making unpopular decisions runs the risk of judges losing the next 
election or being investigated by the Senate. Proof of this occurred when 
the Iowa Supreme Court in Varnum v. Brien143 struck down a ban on 
same-sex marriages on state constitutional grounds, only to see three of its 
judges ousted in the next election.144 This also was illustrated with the 
impeachment of the entire West Virginia Supreme Court over charges of 
corruption.145 Moreover, similar retaliation at the polls has occurred 
elsewhere, such as in California.146 
 
 140. 198 U.S. 45, 75 (1905) (Holmes, J., dissenting). 
 141. See Croley, supra note 125, at 726–27. 
 142. Id. at 727–28; see also Sandra Day O’Connor, Take Justice Off the Ballot, N.Y. 
TIMES (May 22, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/05/23/opinion/23oconnor.html 
[https://perma.cc/C8Y6-JCSZ]. 
 143. 763 N.W.2d 862, 906–907 (Iowa 2009). 
 144. A.G. Sulzberger, Ouster of Iowa Judges Sends Signal to Bench, N.Y. TIMES 
(Nov. 3, 2010), https://www.nytimes.com/2010/11/04/us/politics/04judges.html 
[http://perma.cc/XV7M-6JPB]. 
 145. Doug Criss, The West Virginia House Impeached the Entire State Supreme 
Court, CNN (Aug. 14, 2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/08/14/politics/west-virginia-
supreme-court-impeach-trnd/index.html [http://perma.cc/BQB6-RLGH]. 
 146. See Croley, supra note 125, at 737; see also John T. Wold & John H. Culver, 
The Defeat of the California Justices: The Campaign, The Electorate, and the Issue of 
Judicial Accountability, 70 JUDICATURE 348 passim (1987). 
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In addition, the majoritarian problem is not mere conjecture. Studies 
have shown that judicial selection mechanisms do affect who is selected as 
judge.147 Judicial selection impacts the policy role of state supreme courts.148 
In terms of outputs, elected judges seem less likely to overturn death 
penalty decisions when state public opinion supports this punishment.149 
Other studies have found that judicial elections or selection processes 
affect how many opinions partisan or elected judges write or cite,150 how 
they rule on abortion in states where public opinion is pro-life,151 how 
appellate judges approach criminal matters on appeal,152 and other aspects 
of their decisions.153 The main point is that electing judges changes judicial 
behavior and decision making, lending powerful support to Croley’s 
contention that institutional design does lead to the majoritarian problem. 
C.  A Democratic Theory of State Judicial Review 
Can we solve this problem? Are state elected courts inherently 
majoritarian, and do they face a problem in terms of legitimacy to act? 
 
 147. See, e.g., RICHARD WATSON & RONDAL G. DOWNING, THE POLITICS OF THE 
BENCH AND BAR: JUDICIAL SELECTION UNDER THE MISSOURI NONPARTISAN COURT 
PLAN (1969); Victor Eugene Flango & Craig R. Ducat, What Difference Does Method of 
Judicial Selection Make? Selection Procedures in State Courts of Last Resort, 5 JUST. SYS. 
J. 25 (1979); Elliott Slotnick, Judicial Selection Systems and Nomination Outcomes: Does 
the Process Make a Difference?, 12 AMER. POL. QUART. 225 (1984). 
 148. G. ALAN. TARR & MARY CORNELIA ALDIS PORTER, STATE SUPREME COURTS IN 
STATE AND NATION, 56–57 (1988). 
 149. Paul Brace & Brent D. Boyea, Judicial Selection Methods and Capital 
Punishment in the American States, in MATTHEW J. STREB, RUNNING FOR JUDGE: THE 
RISING POLITICAL FINANCIAL, AND LEGAL STAKES OF JUDICIAL ELECTIONS 186, 199 
(2007). 
 150. See Stephen J. Choi et al., Professionals or Politicians: The Uncertain Empirical 
Case for an Elected Rather Than Appointed Judiciary, 26 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 290, 296–97 
(2010). 
 151. See Brandice Canes-Wrone & Tom S. Clark, Judicial Independence and 
Nonpartisan Elections, 2009 WISC. L. REV. 21, 64–65 (2009). 
 152. See Matias Iaryczower, Garrett Lewis & Matthew Shum, To Elect or to Appoint? 
Bias, Information, and Responsiveness of Bureaucrats and Politicians, 97 J. PUB. ECON. 
230, 243 (2013). 
 153. See, e.g., HERBERT M. KRITZER, JUSTICES ON THE BALLOT: CONTINUITY AND 
CHANGE IN STATE SUPREME COURT ELECTIONS (2015); DANIEL R. PINELLO, THE IMPACT 
OF JUDICIAL-SELECTION METHOD ON STATE-SUPREME-COURT POLICY: INNOVATION, 
REACTION, AND ATROPHY (1995); Melinda Gann Hall, Electoral Politics and Strategic 
Voting in State Supreme Courts 54 J. POL. 427 (1992); Melinda Gann Hall & Paul Brace, 
Toward an Integrated Model of Judicial Voting Behavior, 20 AM. POL. Q. 147 (1992); 
Joanna M. Shepherd, The Influence of Retention Politics on Judges’ Voting, 38 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 169, 169 (2009). 
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First, if the above literature is correct, then elected judges seem destined to 
become majoritarian, and it is unclear if state courts can exercise any 
passive virtues to mitigate this problem.154 Being more conscious of 
institutional design pressures may not be enough to overcome the forces to 
becoming majoritarian. Second, one could argue that majoritarian 
preferences are not inherently averse to minority interests, and therefore 
there is no real risk of judges disfavoring minority rights. Third, one could 
argue that the very process of being elected and being accountable to the 
voters places them on par with other elected institutions in terms of checks 
on policy excess or errors. Fourth, one might argue that if elected courts 
are majoritarian, the solution is making them appointed, as twelve state 
judicial systems currently are. But appointed courts may be counter-
majoritarian.155 Thus, are state courts caught in the dilemma of either being 
majoritarian (if elected) or counter-majoritarian (if not elected)? Not 
necessarily. Possible resolution of the dilemma resides in crafting an 
appropriate theory of democracy for state courts, or reliance upon a state-
by-state constitutional and institutional analysis. 
As discussed above, Madisonian democracy defined a role for the 
federal courts in American society.156 It was a vision that eventually saw the 
federal courts as supposed apolitical institutions, confined by checks and 
balances and separation of powers, seeking to protect minority rights 
against majority rule. One resolution of the counter-majoritarian problem 
as posed by Bickel was to say that American democratic theory and 
constitutionalism is not simply majority winner-take-all, and that instead, 
there is a limited but important role for the federal courts to act to protect 
rights. That role is set by constitutional design and, more importantly, 
evolving federal precedent. While on occasion one can argue that the 
federal courts have overstepped their appropriate role, there is an evolved 
body of law that arguably justifies or legitimizes federal courts in upending 
majority preferences to protect minority rights.157 
Parallel logic can be applied to state courts, although with important 
distinctions. First, a different theory of democracy may be required to 
justify state judicial intervention in the political process. States, their 
constitutions, and courts may not necessarily be grounded in a Madisonian 
 
 154. Helen Hershkoff, State Courts and the “Passive Virtues”: Rethinking the Judicial 
Function, 114 HARV. L. REV. 1833, 1844–76 (2001). 
 155. See supra Section II(C) & (D). 
 156. See supra Section II. 
 157. E.g., League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 447 (2006). 
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theory of democracy, but instead may reflect different conceptions158 and 
constitutional traditions.159 When states began to abandon the federal 
model of appointing judges and began using elections in the early 
nineteenth century, it represented a different theory of how to structure 
democratic institutions. This is the different ontology referred to at the 
beginning of this article. It represented a different alignment of separation 
of powers and checks and balances that contrasts with what is found at the 
federal level.160 State constitutions, and the institutional arrangements that 
come with them, contrast with the federal ones—they are more 
democratic.161 State courts, in some cases, were designed to be major 
policy institutions.162 They often exercise special state powers163 and enforce 
state-specific clauses164 that mandate specific functions for states to 
perform, such as providing for social welfare,165 education,166 or balanced 
budgets.167 Existence of these clauses and positive rights empower state 
courts to act in ways federal courts may not. Thus, state courts do not need 
to follow the federal separation of powers model.168 
The majoritarian criticism of state courts wrongly assumes that they 
are supposed to operate the same way and under the same theory as 
federal courts. They do not. State courts generally can be viewed as co-
equals to the other branches of state government in terms of their 
 
 158. Christian G. Fritz, The American Constitutional Tradition Revisited: Preliminary 
Observations on State Constitution-Making in the Nineteenth-Century West, 25 RUTGERS 
L.J. 945, 991–98 (1994); James A. Henretta, Foreword: Rethinking the State Constitutional 
Tradition, 22 RUTGERS L.J. 819, 824 (1991); Gordon S. Wood, Foreword: State 
Constitution-Making in the American Revolution, 24 RUTGERS L. J. 911, 926 (1993). 
 159. Daniel J. Elazar, The Principles and Traditions Underlying State Constitutions, 
12 PUBLIUS 11, 18–22 (1982). 
 160. See WILLIAMS, supra note 120, at 240. 
 161. See id. at 31, 299; see also Cubberly, supra note 99, at 426. 
 162. See WILLIAMS, supra note 120, at 283. 
 163. Id. at 287. 
 164. Id. at 267–68. 
 165. See, e.g., Tucker v. Toia, 371 N.E.2d. 449, 452–53 (N.Y. 1977). 
 166. See, e.g., In re G.H., 218 N.W.2d 441, 447 (N.D. 1974). All fifty states have 
some clauses requiring them to maintain some free public school for individuals between 
certain ages. See also Michael Heise, Schoolhouses, Courthouses, and Statehouses: 
Educational Finance, Constitutional Structure, and the Separation of Powers Doctrine, 33 
LAND & WATER L. REV. 281, 294–300 (1998). 
 167. See, e.g., Wein v. State, 347 N.E.2d 586, 594 (N.Y. 1976); see also RICHARD 
BRIFFAULT, BALANCING ACTS: THE REALITY BEHIND STATE BALANCED BUDGET 
REQUIREMENTS (1996). 
 168. See WILLIAMS, supra note 120, at 240. 
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legitimacy to make policy or get involved in the political process.169 The 
political question doctrine, or the concept of justiciability as formulated 
and refined in Baker v. Carr, is not necessarily binding on state courts—
they are free to consider issues as justiciable in nature.170 Federal courts, 
according to Landeau, have a more limited concept of justiciability than do 
state courts: 
Federal justiciability doctrine reflects what is often called a 
dispute resolution or private rights model of the role of federal 
courts. According to this view, federal courts exist to resolve 
disputes and nothing else. Their role is not to articulate legal 
principles, enforce laws generally, or ensure that the other 
branches of government behave themselves within the bounds 
of the authority conferred on them by the Constitution.171 
Federal justiciability and standing are rooted in the federal case and 
controversy requirement. State constitutions do not have this case and 
controversy clause.172 For example, Article VI of the Minnesota 
Constitution does not have a case and controversy clause that parallels 
Article III of the U.S. Constitution, and, perhaps as a result, Minnesota 
courts have often recognized greater standing to bring cases,173 especially to 
protect constitutional rights as they affect the political process.174 Arguably, 
Minnesota courts could play a more robust role than federal courts as 
evidenced by the existence of Article I, section 8, the remedies clause, 
which guarantees that “[e]very person is entitled to a certain remedy in the 
laws for all injuries or wrongs which he may receive . . . .”175 
 
 169. See Peter M. Shane, Interbranch Accountability in State Government and the 
Constitutional Requirement of Judicial Independence, 61 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 21, 
21–54 (1998). 
 170. 369 U.S. 186, 216–218 (1962). For example, while in Luther v. Borden (48 U.S. 
1 (1849)), the Supreme Court ruled that the federal courts would not rule on matters of 
what constituted a republican form of government under the Guarantee clause, nothing 
would prevent a state court in theory from ruling such a matter to be justiciable under their 
own constitution. See also Landau, supra note 114, at 1311, 1317 (pointing out that the 
federal judicial power is limited by Article III constraints and that such constraints do not 
apply to state courts.). 
 171. Landau, supra note 114, at 1312. 
 172. Id. at 1315. 
 173. See, e.g., McKee v. Likins, 261 N.W.2d 566, 571 (Minn. 1977) (holding that a 
taxpayer suing as a taxpayer has standing to challenge administrative action). 
 174. See, e.g., Moe v. Alsop, 288 Minn. 323, 330–31, 180 N.W.2d 255, 259–60 
(1970); State ex rel. Dowdall v. Dahl, 69 Minn. 108, 112–14, 71 N.W. 910, 911–12 (1897). 
 175. MINN. CONST. art. I, § 8. Despite the language used in the remedies clause, 
Minnesota courts have not always been receptive to an expansive reading. See State v. 
Lindquist, 869 N.W.2d 863, 873 (Minn. 2015) (“Although some of our early cases suggest 
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In addition to expanded notions of justiciability, state constitutions 
depart from the federal constitutional model of separation of powers.176 In 
some cases, state courts are partners in governance, not simply private 
dispute-resolving institutions.177 They have affirmative powers to enforce 
constitutional powers and duties, share in decision making, and ensure 
that other branches do their job.178 Unlike federal courts, state courts have 
general jurisdiction.179 Additionally, state courts are not limited by federal 
concepts related to justiciability.180 
A general democratic theory of state courts would begin by 
recognizing that all of the precepts of Madisonian democracy do not 
necessarily apply to state courts in the same way that they apply to the 
federal courts. State courts, whether elected or appointed, may have the 
authority to act and render decisions that are majoritarian or counter-
majoritarian. They may have a legitimate role in making policy decisions—
a majoritarian act—and, at the same time, overturning other elected 
institutions as part of their role in enforcing state and federal constitutional 
rights—a counter-majoritarian act. Finally, it is important to keep in mind 
that part of the problem with federal courts acting in a counter-
majoritarian fashion is that the U.S. Constitution is a power-creating 
document. This means that inherent powers for federal institutions must 
be clearly stated in the text of the Constitution or necessarily implied.181 
State constitutions are power-limiting documents, which provide 
institutions broad authority to act unless otherwise limited.182 This 
difference enhances state courts’ authority to act in ways federal 
institutions cannot. 
A specific democratic theory of state court intervention into the 
political process would rest on unique constitutional provisions and case 
law within a state. It would empower individual state judiciaries to act on 
issues that federal or other state courts might not address because of the 
 
an expansive reading of the Remedies Clause, we have subsequently held that the 
Remedies Clause ‘does not guarantee redress for every wrong, but instead enjoins the 
[government] from eliminating those remedies that have vested at common law.’” (citations 
omitted)). 
 176. See Landau, supra note 114, at 1320. 
 177. Id. at 1320–22 (explaining that state constitutions confer much broader judicial 
power and “go well beyond the private adjudication model power”). 
 178. Id. 1311–12. 
 179. Id. at 1318. 
 180. Id. at 1325–26. 
 181. See, e.g., M’Culloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 412–22 (1819) (providing a classic 
statement on the limits of federal government powers). 
 182. See WILLIAMS, supra note 120, at 27. 
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expanded notions of justiciability and the different role that a state court 
has in governance as compared to federal courts.183 States do not face the 
same limitations with the political question doctrine as do federal courts, 
which allows for a different judicial role within a different democratic 
theory.184 
This theory would look to issues regarding whether there are clear 
separation of powers clauses in a state constitution, specific mandates that 
require the government to act,185 other provisions that uniquely declare the 
way legislation is supposed to be passed,186 or mandate duties of the 
judiciary. These constitutional provisions, as well as case law and 
precedent, are all important to declaring and empowering what a specific 
state court can do in that state. This suggests that there may not be an 
across-the-board theory of democracy or judicial review that guides state 
courts regarding when it is permissible for them to intervene in the 
political process. Whether a specific state court is justified in intervening in 
the political or policy process is dependent on the jurisprudence and 
constitutional tradition and values of the state in which it is located.187 
Thus, one way of addressing the majoritarian problem is to say that 
either a general or specific theory of democracy for state courts permits it. 
This option may resolve one aspect of the majoritarian dilemma that state 
courts face. Both elected and appointed state courts may be legitimate in 
getting involved in the political-policy process. But the other aspect of the 
majoritarian problem is specific when it comes to elected judges and how 
that institutional design often disfavors minority rights. What do we do 
then? Assuming the literature on judicial selection is accurate, the greatest 
majoritarian problem facing state courts is that elected judges are less likely 
to favor individual rights compared to appointed systems. If that is the 
case, the obvious answer is to suggest that elected state judges perhaps run 
 
 183. Hershkoff, supra note 154 at 1836–37. 
 184. Id. at 1862–67. 
 185. See, e.g., Seattle School Dist. No. 1 of King County v. State, 585 P.2d 71, 95 
(Wash. 1978) (ordering the legislature to fulfill its constitutional duty by defining and fully 
funding “basic education” and a “basic program of education”). 
 186. MINN. CONST. art. 4, § 17 (“No law shall embrace more than one subject, which 
shall be expressed in its title.”). 
 187. See, e.g., L. Harold Levinson, Interpreting State Constitutions by Resort to the 
Record, 6 Fla. St. U.L. Rev. 567, 574 (1978) (examining factors that affect state 
constitutional interpretation); Williams, supra note 120, 82–86 (reviewing the role of 
tradition in state constitutional adjudication and interpretation); Thad B. Zmistowski, City 
of Portland v. Depaolo: Defining the Role of Stare Decisis in State Constitutional 
Decisionmaking, 41 ME. L. REV. 201, 212–21 (1989) (discussing specific issues on how to 
treat precedent in state law). 
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counter to a theory of judicial review that emphasizes protection of 
minority rights. Simply eliminating elected judges and replacing them with 
an appointed bench might be the answer, but the reality is that there is 
probably little support for it. 
Croley may be partially correct. While state courts may have greater 
authority to intervene into political controversies, in some cases they may 
pose greater risks to individual rights. The solution, if any, lies perhaps in 
crafting specific state constitutional clauses or mandates that direct state 
judicial review. The second option is to recognize that state courts may 
need to be understood within the context of a federal system, where 
judicial federalism establishes a floor of federal rights that may not be 
violated by state institutions.188 This suggests that the federal courts may 
need to serve as a check on state courts that fail to protect rights.189 The 
solution may not be completely satisfactory, but it does ensure that some 
of the majoritarian tendencies of elected courts are tempered. Finally, 
there is a need for state courts to directly confront this dilemma by 
defining limits or strategies regarding how to determine when and how to 
intervene in the political process. Thus far, at best, state courts seem more 
ad hoc than general in defining a jurisprudence of intervention into the 
political process, and further, how such intervention fits into a state theory 
of democracy. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
State judicial systems are located in a different political and legal 
context when compared to the federal courts. They operate under unique 
state constitutions and traditions that often empower and obligate them to 
act in ways that contrast to the authority granted to federal courts. 
Recognizing these legal and institutional differences may equip state courts 
with authority and competence to act on matters that contrast with federal 
judicial authority. 
State judiciaries may be asked to address difficult political and policy 
issues as their coordinate branches become as politically deadlocked or 
divided as the federal government. State constitutional traditions, enabling 
a general or state-specific theory of democracy or judicial review, may not 
only permit, but obligate state courts to act to resolve many of these issues. 
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